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WASHINGTON -- Against the
sensitive backdrop of grandparent-grandchild
relationships, the U.S. Supreme Court will soon
open a rare window into its thinking about the
nature and extent of the constitutional right of
parents to raise their children.
The justices have not engaged in a
substantive discussion of parental rights for at
least a decade. And two key high court precedents
that established the right of parental autonomy
-- and that figure largely in the justices'
latest family law challenge -- are themselves
more than 70 years old.
But the question the justices will
hear argued on Wednesday is a very modern one: Do
two Washington state laws that allow any third
party, including grandparents, to petition for
visitation rights with a child violate parents'
fundamental right to make child-rearing
decisions?
The answer could have a wide
impact. In 1977, only six states had so-called
grandparent visitation laws on the books. Today,
such laws exist in all 50 states.
The issue in Troxel v. Granville,
99-138, has implications beyond the grandparents'
rights label attached to the case, say scholars:
In this age of single parents, gay parenting
couples, test-tube babies and other
nontraditional relationships, how will the law
deal with the fact that many others beside a
biological mother and father may have a real
interest in a child and that the child may have a
real interest in a relationship with them?
"That's such an enormously
difficult question that I think the Supreme Court
would not want to resolve it in this particular
case," says Erwin Chemerinsky, a
constitutional law scholar at the University of
Southern California Law School.
In tackling the constitutionality
of the Washington statutes, he and others agree
that the justices are likely to answer a more
basic question: whether the right of parents to
raise their children is fundamental and triggers
the Constitution's most searching scrutiny of
state attempts to interfere.
The high court's recognition of
this parental right first came in 1923, long
before the justices' modern formulation of
different levels of scrutiny for different
rights. Because the justices have never said that
strict scrutiny applies, some lower courts
contend that the law is unclear on where parental
rights fit in the hierarchy of constitutional
rights.
"It forces the court again to
deal with the issue of unenumerated rights,"
says Chemerinsky. "Would Justice [Antonin]
Scalia [a tough skeptic of unenumerated rights]
call into question the very existence of this
right, even though it has been recognized since
the 1920s? This case really puts us right back
into the debate over how to interpret the
Constitution."
FROM TRAGEDY TO COURT
The Troxel case -- like so many visitation
battles -- arose from a family tragedy. Tommie
Granville was the mother of three children from a
prior marriage when she began living with Brad
Troxel. The couple subsequently had two children
of their own and then separated, and Brad
returned home to live with his parents. The
children continued to see their father and
grandparents. Brad committed suicide in 1993, but
the grandparents still had visits with his
children after his death.
Tommie Granville eventually met and
married a man with two children of his own. She
cut back on her children's visits with Brad's
parents, says her lawyer, asking for time to
blend together the new family. She never intended
or suggested that she would end visits with the
Troxels, says Catherine Smith, of Seattle's
Edwards, Sieh, Smith & Goodfriend, who will
argue the high court case. Granville, she adds,
was juggling five sets of grandparents.
The Troxels petitioned a Washington
court for visitation rights. Two state laws
permit interested third parties to petition for
visitation with a minor child if visitation is
"in the best interests of the child."
The Troxels won a visitation decree in the trial
court but lost in two appeals.
In a decision that consolidated the
Troxel case with two others, the Washington
Supreme Court struck down the two state laws as a
violation of parents' constitutional rights.
Relying on such precedents as Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the court said
the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that
parents have a fundamental right to control their
children's upbringing and that this right cannot
be infringed without a compelling governmental
interest.
"Short of preventing harm to
the child, the standard of 'best interests of the
child' is insufficient to serve as a compelling
state interest overruling a parent's fundamental
rights," wrote the state high court.
"State intervention to better a child's
quality of life through third-party visitation is
not justified where the child's circumstances are
otherwise satisfactory."
The court found other problems with
the state laws: no safeguards to prevent stable
families from being forced to defend against
frivolous visitation petitions; no requirement
that a petitioner prove he or she has a
substantial relationship with the child; and no
mandate that a court consider the parents'
reasons for restricting visitation.
The Washington laws are the most
broadly written visitation laws in the country,
"which is why I wish the court would look
around and say, 'We're going to hold this for a
day when we can have a proper state case,'"
says family law practitioner Barbara Handschu,
vice president of the American Academy of
Matrimonial Lawyers. "There are so many
better-written statutes."
The academy filed an amicus
brief in Troxel, supporting neither party.
"Under proper circumstances, we believe
third parties should be permitted access,"
explains Handschu, "but we have not clearly
defined what those special circumstances should
be."
New York's grandparent visitation
statute, she notes, requires a threshold showing
by grandparents that they had prior access, that
access has been thwarted and that they continued
to attempt to see the grandchildren. Only after
that showing has been made, she says, should a
court turn to the best interests of the child and
the parents' reasons. But the New York law is
flawed, in the academy's view, because it permits
access only by grandparents and siblings.
The Washington statutes were doomed
because the "best interests of the
child" test was undefined and standardless,
says Catherine Smith. "Grandparents are
great, and extended families should be supported
-- but not supported by allowing litigation like
this. Having clear standards in domestic
relations is very important. Everybody talks
about these cases by describing their own
relationship with their grandchildren or
grandparents. That's why you need burdens and
presumptions -- to keep judges focused on the
family in front of them instead of on a
particular family relationship that may have
resonance for them."
WHAT STANDARD?
In the course of representing Granville, Smith
has drawn support from a wide array of groups,
including the American Civil Liberties Union, the
Institute for Justice and the Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund. While all her
supporters want the state court judgment
affirmed, they do not all agree on the standard
for measuring the constitutionality of these
statutes.
The ACLU tracks the state high
court decision, arguing that "absent some
showing of substantial harm" to the
children, parents have a constitutional right to
raise their children without state interference.
Lambda, however, urges the court to impose
certain requirements on third parties: They
should demonstrate that they have an unusually
significant relationship with the child and that
the parents had encouraged that relationship.
After third parties make that showing, say Lambda
lawyers, courts then could apply the "best
interests of the child" standard.
On the other side, the Troxels'
high court counsel, Mark Olson, a Seattle solo
practitioner, argues that the laws should be
judged not by strict scrutiny, but by the
rational-basis test. A finding that visitation is
in a child's best interests, he adds, should be
sufficient to overcome parental opposition.
"Visitation orders in favor of
grandparents do not . . . violate a fundamental
liberty interest," argues Olson, explaining
that those orders differ from fundamental
parental decisions such as those involving
education and religion. "We do not contend
that grandparents have a constitutional right to
visitation orders. Striking the balance between
parent-child and grandchild-grandparent interests
involves a difficult assessment of complex and
often-changing social, familial and personal
issues. In general, that is a choice for the
states to make."
Olson, too, has found strong
support from outside groups, including the
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP),
state and local government organizations and
grandparents' rights groups. Lawyers for AARP
argue that upholding the Washington Supreme Court
decision would "invalidate virtually all
grandparent visitation statutes nationwide."
When grandparent visitation became
an issue in the 1980s, "the courts seemed to
ignore the traditional analysis that is usually
required when you tell a parent he or she can't
do something with their child," says
Kathleen Bean, a family law expert at the
University of Louisville's Louis D. Brandeis
School of Law. "Courts would set out the
question, and the next paragraph would be about
this sort of unquantifiable value of
grandparents' relationship and love, and then
they would say everything is okay. It's almost as
if someone had deleted the middle of the
opinion."
Now it is time for the Supreme
Court to fill in the middle, she says.
What should be in the middle is
somewhat uncertain because the high court, in the
older precedents at issue in Troxel, never
used the modern language of scrutiny, says
Chemerinsky.
"One could say there's no case
that ever expressly said that as to this right,
it's strict scrutiny," he says. "That's
true, but the clear implication of the cases is,
this is a fundamental right, and the government
has to meet strict scrutiny or something like
it."
Sorting this out could revive the
recent vigorous debate between justices Scalia
and David Souter over unenumerated rights, says
Professor Douglas Kmiec, at Pepperdine University
School of Law in Malibu. "Scalia argues
unenumerated rights are not to be found unless
they are anchored in a very specific tradition or
history of the nation," says Kmiec.
"Souter, on the other hand, has adopted a
much looser formulation . . . that gives the
Supreme Court a larger role in determining their
existence."
The Troxel case gives both
sides of the court the opportunity to refine
competing theories, in a sensitive context --
more and more grandparents are raising young
children.
"The social policy in favor of
grandparent influence seems to be at its
zenith," says Kmiec. "And at the same
time, parental rights is an area the court has
neglected for decades."
© NLP IP Company,
Tuesday, January 11, 2000
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